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I. INTRODUCTION
In military medicine, "the golden hour" refers to the critical first moments that significantly reduce the mortality rate of battlefield casualties. The recognition that improved response times reduce mortality explains the significant efforts undertaken by the military to develop and introduce new medical technologies. The decline in the mortality rate of military casualties mirrors a similar trend in the recently observed homicides among civilians. Using launch dates of various stages of 9-1-1 (911) implementation, we test the hypothesis that technological innovations that lowered the cost of saving lives through shortened response times have led to reduced "lethal" aggravated assaults, and therefore, homicides.
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Homicides as well as most other major crimes peaked in the early 1970s and 1980s and have since declined. Much of the recent academic literature on crime focuses on explaining this downward trend (Blumstein and Wallman 2006; Levitt 2004) . Hypotheses explaining the decrease in crime rates include increased incarceration, a larger police force, abortion (Donohue & Levitt, 2001) , and decreases in illegal substance abuse (Golub and Johnson 1994; Levitt 2004; Bowling 1999) . 2 We consider an additional explanation for the decline in homicide rates, an explanation based on improvements in the 911 emergency response system and the adoption of cell phones. 1 We consider the launch dates of the three major improvements to the 911 emergency system. 2 Among the scholarly works providing explanations for variations in homicides, researchers have studied the effect of community policing and better policing strategies (Corman and Mocan 2001; Zhao Schieder and Thurman 2002) , the consequences of changing demographics (Levitt 1999) , improved economic conditions (Raphael and WinterEbmer 2001; Rosenfeld and Fornango 2007) , new security technologies (Farrell et al 2011) , increased imprisonment (Levitt 1996; Donohue and Siegelman 1998; Liedka Piehl and Useem 2006) , deterrent effects from cell phone use on the streets (Klick et al. 2012) , aborted potential criminals (Donohue & Levitt, 2001) , reduced illegal substance abuse (Golub and Johnson 1994; Levitt 2004; Bowling 1999) , improvements in medicine (Doerner W. , 1983) , and the introduction of credit cards to distribute welfare payments (Wright et al. 2014) . None of these works focuses on informational improvements in communication technology that reduced the response time for the provision of medical care.
Both innovations, that is, the adoption of 911 and the adoption of cell phones, improved the quality of information and the rapidity of information transmission. We hypothesize that improvements in communication technologies shortened response times, leading to a decrease in deaths from aggravated assaults, i.e., homicides.
3 Current theories that explain the recent decrease in crime, tend to apply to all types of crimes, and it would be consistent with these theories to observe similar decreases in homicides and aggravated assaults. However, Figure 1 depicts the annual percentage change in homicide and aggravated assault rates, showing a divergence in these series. The vertical axis in Figure 1 measures the percentage changes in these two crime rates relative to 1964, which is set as the base year. The graph shows that percentage changes in aggravated assault and homicide rates are highly correlated from 1964 to about 1974, after which the two series diverge. Aggravated assault rates rose during the early 1980s and then, after a brief leveling off, continued to climb into the early 1990s. The graph further shows that homicide rates stopped increasing in 1974, leveled off with two bumps, which are associated with the increases in aggravated assaults around 1980 and 1990, and then steadily declined after the early 1990s. Figure 1 further shows that in 2014, the aggravated assault rate is more than twice the size than in 1964. However, homicides in 2014 are only at 92 percent of 1964 levels.
Our model predicts the divergence in homicide and aggravated assault rates observed in Figure 1 , because after 1973, many cities had adopted emergency 911 services, which reduced response times and improved information transmissions, thereby lowering deaths associated with crimes. Further, our model predicts the continued decline in homicides following the 3 The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) website defines aggravated assault as "an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury." The UCR site also states, "…this type of assault is usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or by other means likely to produce death or great bodily harm." (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2011) introduction of additional 911 innovations due to the continued shortening of response times.
Our results provide evidence that all three 911 innovations considered in this paper have contributed to the observed decreases in homicides. Further, our findings show that 911
innovations have changed the number of aggravated assaults. This is due in part because any assault that does not result in a homicide is by definition an aggravated assault. Thus, by pure mechanics, saved lives implies more aggravated assaults. However, we also report evidence that suggest that the initial 911 innovation led to more reporting of aggravated results, while the more recent, cell-phone related innovations appear to have had a deterrent effect on aggravated assaults.
We collected annual data for 112 of the largest U.S. cities from 1964 to 2014, indicating the year when a city adopted Basic 9-1-1 (Basic 911), Enhanced 9-1-1 (E911), and wireless (GPS 911) emergency services. Crime data come from the FBI. To identify a causal effect of these technological innovations on homicides, we employ difference-in-differences and event studies. Results show that the technological innovations had a large quantitative and statistically significant effect in reducing homicides and increasing aggravated assaults. The event study results show quantitatively important drops in homicide rates in the year of the introduction of each technological innovation.
We also test whether any changes in violent behavior, such as a change in the use of guns vs. knives, can explain the divergence in homicides and aggravated assaults. Further, we use a
number of falsification tests to analyze the robustness of our findings. The results from the sum of these tests support our hypothesis that response-time-reducing 911 services contributed significantly to the decline in homicide rates.
II. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

A. Deployment of 911
The first proposal for a nationwide emergency phone number came from the National 
C. Hypotheses
We hypothesize that Basic 911, E911 and GPS 911 led to significant reductions in homicide rates.
The mechanism that led to the declines in homicides through 911 innovations is the subsequent and immediate reduction in response time. With the adoption of these communication interventions, individuals with serious injuries were able to more easily and quickly report the injury, benefited from faster emergency services notification and emergency services travel time, were more likely stabilized by emergency services, and were more likely to reach an emergency room alive to receive life-saving medical treatments. Each subsequent innovation is an incremental improvement over the previous 911 technologies.
D. Causal Channels and Mechanisms: Response Times
Before the introduction of 911 services, an individual seeking assistance in an emergency would first have to locate the correct phone number, or dial "0" to reach an operator, who typically was an employee of the telephone company. The introduction of Basic 911 reduced response times by making it easier for a victim or a witness to remember the three digits that could connect them to the appropriate emergency service. A county-level study performed in 1984 reported that, without the availability of 911, a victim's success rate of reaching the appropriate emergency service was 63 percent, while with an active 911 service, the success rate increased to 82 percent-an increase of over 30 percent. In addition, the introduction of 911 increased the probability of using a dedicated emergency phone number from 40 percent to 74 percent (Mayron et al 1984) , which was another contributor to reducing response times. Blackwell and Kaufmann (1984) GPS 911 improved response times, because when cell phones had a GPS chip, location identification was improved. Moreover, if callers changed location after they had placed a 911
call and had their cell phone with them, the changed location could be tracked.
However, GPS 911 faces technological challenges. These include the loss of GPS signals in high-rise urban areas, the difficulty in identifying the floor of a multi-story building from which a wireless call originates and the incompatibility or lack of standardized communications among cell phone manufacturers, wireless network providers, and 911 systems software.
III. EMPIRICAL METHODS
A. Data Sources
We analyze annual data from 1964 to 2014. By focusing on this 51-year period, our window of analysis includes several years prior to the implementation of the first 911 emergency services and extends to recent times.
In our We collected city-level homicide and aggravated assault data, and data on the type of weapon used in aggravated assaults from reports provided to the FBI by U.S. city police departments. Prior to the early 1980s, the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data at the county level are not accurate for all counties, because in some counties not all police departments reported statistics or they reported incomplete statistics. This was primarily the case for police departments located in smaller cities. However, the data reported by police departments located in the largest cities and data reported for the more serious crimes, such as murder and aggravated assaults, are reliable even prior to 1980 (Pridemore 2005) . In our study, we use data from police department reports from large cities and we are thus using reliable data. The selection criteria for inclusion of a city in our dataset were those cities with population sizes over 200,000 in at least one year of our sample period, and complete or nearly complete observations dating back several years before their implementation of any 911 services. We identified 112 cities that met these criteria.
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To identify the launch dates of Basic 911 and E911 services, we contacted local call centers and collected launch dates from local newspaper archives. Start dates for the launch of GPS 911 come from two Federal Communication Commission (FCC) reports, indicating the earliest dates when cities in our sample could make use of these services. For GPS 911, call centers could only offer this service when they had support for GPS services, and when the local wireless providers had the technology to transmit the GPS coordinates. Once both conditions were met, a city offered GPS 911. We define a 911 innovation as being implemented when a city had the emergency service in place for more than half of the year. implementing Basic 911. In contrast, cities adopting GPS 911 already had either Basic 911 or E911 services.
A potential cause for the declining homicide rates might be changes in the mix of weapons used to commit aggravated assaults. Guns are the most lethal weapons, followed by knives, suggesting that a decline in the use of guns in aggravated assaults might explain the decline in homicides. 6 To address this potential concern, we collected data on weapons used in each homicide and aggravated assault incident. These data are available from the aforementioned police department reports and we aggregated incidence data to the city and year level. use is lower than it is in 2014. This suggests that these aggregate numbers do not show a decline in gun use, which potentially could have explained the decline in homicide rates presented in Figure 1 . In our empirical analysis, one of our controls is the differences in the weapon mix between cities and over time.
B. Estimation Methods
We estimate the model (1) ln yit = βCommunicationInnovationit + αXit + μi + νt + εit where yit, depending on the specification, is either the number of homicide per 100,000 residents in city i in year t, or the number of aggravated assaults per 100,000 city residents.
The vector CommunicationInnovationit includes three indicator variables for each of the 911 innovations. They are Basic911, E911, and GPS911. Given that we express the dependent variable as the natural logarithm, the estimated coefficients on these 911 innovations measure the percentage impact of these services on the dependent variable in equation (1). 7 The point estimate on Basic911 measures the impact of moving from a situation of no 911 services to Basic 911. In our coding of the data, once a city adopts E911 after having already adopted Basic 911, the E911 indicator switches from "0" to "1", and the Basic911 indicator remains "1". The estimated coefficients on all 911 innovations measure the percentage impact of that innovation relative the 911 service that existed prior to that innovation.
All regressions include city and year fixed effects, μi and νt respectively. Year fixed effects capture medical improvements that are largely systemic. City fixed effects capture timeinvariant city observable and unobservable variables, such as a violent or peaceful city culture.
The identifying assumption in our model is that city trends are parallel. 8 We test the validity of our identifying assumption, as well as offer several falsification tests.
The Xit vector in the regression model includes crime specific variables such as the type of weapons used in homicides and aggravated assaults, aggregated to the city and year level.
We include these variables to control for the possibility that changes in weapon use over time might affect homicide or aggravated assault rates. Specifically, we include the percent of 7 The exact percentage impact is given by (exp(β) − 1)). 8 The parallel trends assumption is not met when those cities who are on a steeper path to increased homicides, for example, because of an inflow of gangs, are more likely to adopt 911 services. An increase in gangs changes city homicide trends if gangs change a city's ratio of homicides to aggravated assaults.
aggravated assaults with gun use, the percent with knives use, and the percent with the use of fists or other body parts. The category "other weapon" is the reference category.
The Xit vector also includes socioeconomic city characteristics such as real per capita income, population density, and race. We measure annual city population density as the number of city residents per year divided by the number of square miles of land in a city per year. For each city of our sample, we obtained these city square mile data from county records of city expansions.
Annual city median per capita income comes from U.S. Census records and we measure this variable in real year-2000 dollars. The U.S. Census Bureau is also the source for annual citylevel race data.
Another control variable in our regression model is the household adoption rate of a cell phone as the primary phone-that is, households that replaced their landline telephone service with wireless cell phones. For 2005 and from 2007 to 2014, these cell phone adoption statistics are available from three National Center for Health Statistics Reports (Blumburg, et al., 2011) .
We linked these data to the cities in our sample. Using a binomial interpolation from the trend between 2005 and 2014, we estimated adoption rates for the years without data availability prior to 2005.
For our second empirical design, we test our hypothesis by estimating the discontinuity in homicides and aggravated assaults at the launch event of each 911 service.
ln yitj = βCommunicationInnovationitj + φf(trendtj) + αXitj + μi + νt + εitj j = -3,…0…,+3
In this event study design, we estimate separate regressions for each of the three communication innovations. We estimate these regressions with either log homicides or log aggravated assaults as the dependent variable. We are using a narrow window, spanning seven years. This window includes three years prior to the launch of a 911 innovation, the year of the launch, and three years after the launch of a 911 innovation. We use the same set of control variables as in the difference-in-differences model, namely the weapon mix and the socioeconomic characteristics, as well as city fixed effects μi. We also include an indicator, νt,
for the calendar year that a city is observed in our time window.
In equation (2), f(trendtj) represents three functional forms for trends. They are a linear trend, a quadratic trend, and separate trends before and after the launch of each 911 service.
In both models (1) and (2), we cluster standard errors at the city level. As a robustness check, we also cluster standard errors at the state level. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the 112 cities included in our data. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our variables. Table 2 shows the estimates from the difference-in-differences model with log homicides as the dependent variable. All specifications include both city and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the city level.
IV. RESULTS
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In Table 2 , the regression specification reported in the first column includes all three 911
innovations. To capture the city and year specific level of violence, we also include aggravated assaults. 10 All coefficients on these 911 innovations are negative, as hypothesized, and both the indicates that once all three innovations were introduced, homicides rates are roughly 35 percent lower than they would have been without the introduction of these innovations. Further, the results in column 2 show that the declines in homicides associated with 911
innovations cannot be attributed to changes in the type of violence committed in aggravated assaults. The point estimates on the weapons variables show that relative to the omitted category "other weapon," aggravated assaults that involve the use of guns have the largest effect on homicides, followed by knives.
11 Table 2 , column 3 adds various socioeconomic characteristics to the specification in column 1. Relative to column 1, the coefficients and corresponding clustered standard errors are virtually unchanged for the three 911 communication innovations, indicating that the adoption of 911 services are uncorrelated with our included observable socioeconomic characteristics. Table 2 , column 4 includes all of our control variables. Again, relative to the first three specifications, we do not observe much of a change in the magnitude and the level of statistical significance for the three 911 innovations. Given that we estimate log-linear specifications, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the communication innovations in Table 2 , column 4
imply that the adoption of Basic 911 services led to a 15.4 (exp(−0.167) − 1) percent decrease in homicide rates. While the adoption of E911 resulted in only an additional 3.7 percent decrease, the adoption of GPS 911 services resulted in an additional 19.6 percent decrease in homicide rates (Table 2 , column 4). All three coefficients on the emergency services innovations are jointly statistically significant, and summing all three coefficients implies that that the adoption of all three emergency services resulted in a 35.5 percent decrease in homicides. Table 2 , column 4. To understand the dynamics underlying the effectiveness of 911 innovations in reducing homicides, Figure 4 shows the estimated coefficients when substituting each of the 911 indicators in Table 2 , column 4 with seven separate indicators. These seven separate indicators are comprised of three indicators for the each of the three years prior to the adoption of the 11 For the period analyzed in this paper, the FBI reports the type of weapon used in an aggravated assault, but not the type of weapon used in a homicide. Thus, we use the former measure in our regressions.
technology, one indicator for the year of the launch of the technology, and three indicators for the first two years and three-plus years after the launch of the technology. 12 The plots in the panels in Figure 4 display the point estimate for each set of these indicators for each of the three 911 innovations. Further, the plots show the 95 percent confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors at the city level. Panels A and C, corresponding to the Basic 911 and GPS 911 innovations, show that homicide rates are relatively constant prior to the introduction of the new technology, then drop sharply following the launch of a 911 innovation, and that homicide rates stay relatively constant in the following years.
For the effects of the E911 innovation the individual plots of the annual regression coefficients are especially informative. The regression results in Table 2 seem to indicate that the E911 innovation was not effective with respect to reducing homicides. However, Table 4 , Panel B shows that once E911 was launched, there was a sharp drop in homicides, which remains below pre-launch homicide rates in the two years after the launch. Only in the three-plus year category are homicides above pre-launch levels. Thus, it is this latter increase in homicides that explains why the estimated coefficient on E911 in Table 2 is small, and the increase in the threeplus-years category might be due to factors other than the E911 introduction. In sum, all three panels in Figure 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that the introduction of each iteration of 911 led to an immediate and significant decreases in homicide rates. Table 3 tests whether the parallel trends assumption holds for the specifications shown in Table 2 . The first four columns include city specific time trends and the last four columns include city specific quadratic trends. We find that most estimated coefficients on the Basic 911 and GPS 911 innovations remain negative and statistically significant and at similar magnitude levels as in Table 2 . The estimated coefficients on E911 increase in size relative to Table 2 , and are statistically significant. Of the 24 coefficients on the 911 innovations reported in Table 3, only two coefficients are substantially smaller than those in Table 2 , which are the Basic 911 coefficients in column 3 and the GPS 911 coefficient in column 7. Therefore, using both linear and quadratic trends, overall the point estimates on the 911 innovations remain quantitatively important, suggesting that this difference-in-differences model largely conforms to the parallel trends assumption. Table 4 is the log aggravated assault rates. All regressions include city and year fixed effects, and, as in the previous tables, standard errors are clustered at the city level.
In Table 4 , column 1, besides the unreported city and year fixed effects, only the three 911 innovations are included. Table 4 , column 2 adds controls for the weapons used in crimes committed in a given year and city; column 3 adds to the column 1 specification controls for socioeconomic characteristics of the city in a given year; and column 4 adds all control variables from the previous two columns. Table 4 shows that the point estimates on the Basic 911 and E911 innovations have a positive sign and are statistically significant, indicating that the introduction of both iterations of 911 led to an increase in the reporting of aggregate assaults. The coefficients on both of these emergency services innovations are of similar magnitude and statistically significant across all four specifications, and thus are robust to the inclusion of different control variables and slightly different sample sizes that are due to data availability. The introduction of Basic 911 led to about a 10 percent increase in the reporting of aggravated results, and the subsequent introduction of E911 led to an additional 14 percent increase in the reporting of aggravated assaults (Table 4, column 2).
However, the introduction of GPS 911 is associated with a subsequent 12 percent decrease in aggravated assault reporting. 13 This latter finding is consistent with the hypothesis that cell phone use, especially when combined with GPS 911, has a deterrent effect on crime.
GPS 911 could not improve the reporting of domestically located aggravated assaults, given that most individuals, by the introduction of GPS 911, had landlines with access to either Basic 911 or E911. However, GPS 911 could have an influence on the reporting of aggravated assaults observed outside of a home, but the availability of cell phones used outside of the home, combined with the ability to use GPS 911, also had the potential to deter criminal activity.
The introduction of Basic 911 was at a time when there were only landlines, and thus besides calling from public phone booths, individuals had no other choice than to call emergency services via landlines. The introduction of E911 resulted in faster response times, given that a caller's landline address was displayed on the dispatchers' monitors, (but still limited emergency calls to those from home landlines and phone booths). In contrast, GPS 911 allowed individuals to call emergency services from outside their residence. GPS 911 increases the probability that an offender will be captured, because GPS 911 reduces police response time to street crimes.
Thus, when potential violent street offenders know that cell phone users have a quick way to reach the police, via GPS 911, their incentive to commit a crime decreases. Our estimates seem to indicate that for GPS 911, the deterrent capability of cell phone use with GPS 911 capabilities outweighed the reporting of previously unreported aggravated assaults. emergency services are also unlikely to have a reporting effect, that is, the availability of 911 is unlikely to increase the likelihood that these crimes are reported. This is because robbery, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft are property crimes. Victims of these crimes have an incentive to report these crimes to obtain insurance payments and thus the availability of emergency 911 is unlikely to provide a strong additional incentive for reporting of these property crimes.
The estimation results from these specifications are consistent with our hypotheses. With the exception of a significant negative effect on burglaries with GPS 911, none of the other point estimates on the 911 innovations are negative. All of these twelve estimates are relatively small when compared to the corresponding estimates in the homicide and assault regressions and none are statistically significant. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that the 911 innovations reduced homicides and not factors unaccounted for in our regression framework.
To strengthen the causal interpretation of our findings, we take advantage of the response-time discontinuity generated following the introduction of each technology. We thus use event studies to estimate the effect of 911 services on homicides and aggravated assaults. Table 6 presents the event study results with homicides as the dependent variable. The table reports the discontinuity estimates from nine regressions; we estimate one regression for each of the three 911 innovations, and for each of these innovations we estimate one specification with a linear trend, another specification with a quadratic trend, and a third specification with a piecewise linear trend. The latter specification allows for a separate linear trend before and after the launch of each innovation. All specifications include the same control variables as the specification in Table 2 , column 4, and we cluster standard errors at the city level. For each city with the 911 innovation under consideration, we include three years prior to the launch of the 911 technology, the year of the launch, and three years that followed the launch.
In Table 6 , each of the point estimates shows the marginal effect of a 911 innovation with respect to reducing homicides over the previous 911 innovation or lack of 911 services.
All estimated coefficients on the 911 innovations are negative in Table 6 , as hypothesized. The statistically significant -0.183 coefficient for Basic 911, using a piecewise linear trend, implies a seventeen percent reduction in homicide that can be attributed to this 911
innovation. This magnitude is of very similar magnitude to the corresponding finding in the difference-in-differences estimates in Table 2 . The coefficients for E911 and GPS 911 are also statistically significant with the coefficient on E911 also implying a 17 percent reduction in homicides, and the coefficient on GPS 911 implying a 37 percent reduction in homicides, relative to the previous 911 innovation. generate these graphs, we create equal-sized bins in which we put our 112 cities. Next, we plot the corresponding data points and estimated regression slopes from Table 6 for the three years prior to the adoption of each service and both the adoption year and the three years following the adoption. In all three panels, the pattern is similar, with small increasing trends in homicide rates and sharp drops upon the launch of each innovation. Despite the small increasing trends, in all three panels, the homicide rate is lower in year three after the launch, than in each of the three years prior to the launch. Table 7 shows the event study estimates for aggravated assaults, using the same presentation pattern of results as in Table 6 . Figure 7 presents a graphical presentation of the specifications in Table 7 that correspond to the two separate linear trends specifications. In the linear and quadratic trends specifications, we find that the introduction of Basic 911 and E911 led to a between six and ten percent increase in the reporting of aggravated assaults. While the coefficients in the difference-in-differences regressions for these interventions were somewhat larger than reported here, these findings are broadly consistent with those in Table 4 . Moreover, Figure 7 shows that in the two linear trends specifications, which is our most flexible functional form estimated, no large jump in aggravated assaults occurred immediately after launch of Basic 991 and GPS 91, which is consistent with the reported point estimates in Figure 5 . However, Figure 7 shows that there is a noticeable increase in the reporting of aggravated assaults after the E911 introduction. However, the point estimate on E911 is not statistically significant in the two linear trends specifications, as shown in Table 7 .
V. CASE STUDIES
To document how the introduction of 911 has changed homicide rates in specific cities, we show how homicides evolved over time in two of our sample cities. is correlated with an immediate and significant drop of 36 percent in homicide rates.
These two examples show that the 911 innovation effects we are reporting in our regression results are also noticeable when comparing unconditional city-level homicide means before and after the introduction of 911. Moreover, these anecdotes provide additional support for the hypothesis that declines in homicides associated with 911 innovations were largely due to saving lives, and that these declines cannot be solely contributed to, for example, changing demographics, better policing strategies, or less substance abuse.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While the level of violent crimes, measured as aggravated assaults, is 219 percentage points higher in 2014 than in 1964, homicides in 2014 are eight percentage points lower than in 1964 ( Figure 1 ). In this paper, we find support for the hypothesis that the introduction of 911 services explains much of the decrease in homicide rates. Moreover, the introduction of 911
provides an explanation for the divergence between aggravated assault and homicide rates that started in the early 1970s. In our analysis, we document the economic value of shortening response times and the benefit of decreasing the time cost of emergency responses. We show that several 911 innovations lowered the production costs of saving lives, and subsequently led to fewer homicides.
The empirical results in this paper indicate that reductions in emergency response times played a significant role in reducing U.S. homicides over the past 45 years. Both of our empirical approaches, the difference-in-differences and event studies, support the hypothesis that 911 emergency services and the innovations that occurred in providing these services significantly reduced homicide rates. Moreover, our falsification tests provide additional support for the causal interpretation of our findings. 14 A 34 percent drop in homicide rates is predicted from the estimation results reported in Table 2 . 15 A 56 percent drop in homicide rates is predicted from the estimation results with linear trends in Table 3 . Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2 City Notes: Statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, and ***. Standard errors clustered at the city level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log homicide rate per 100,000 populations in a given city and year. For the types of weapons used, the left-out category is 'other weapon'. Notes: Statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, and ***. Standard errors clustered at the city level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log assault rate per 100,000 populations in a given city and year. For the types of weapons used, the left-out category is 'other weapon'. Notes. The emergency service is coded as "0" for years prior to implementation and as "1" otherwise. Three years are included before the launch of the service, followed by the launch year and the three years following. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the city level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
